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Dominican University, River Forest, USA 
The 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak con stituted 
the biggest crisis ever to affect the UK farming sys tem; it was 
one of the worst epidemics of its kind in the world. Farmers 
and rural communities were disrupted and traumatized as 
FMD spread rapidly through the whole of the country. The 
crisis unfolded as a series of information and communication 
problems, primarily from government to farmers, with con­
sequences for action in a time of crisis. Farmers needed in­
formation at the different stages of the crisis to inform them 
about the various processes and pro cedures that had to be 
carried out once a farm had been in fected, and information 
on the complex system of bio security measures introduced 
by the government. As these measures were implemented to 
control the spread of the disease, the places where farmers 
usually met to communi cate and exchange information either 
shut down or became in accessible. There were many gaps in 
the information needed; there was not enough information; it 
conflicted with earlier information or information from other 
sources; and it was disseminated and received too late for 
the required pur pose. The paper explores the role of rumour 
and gossip as a means of conveying information between the 
various actors during the crisis. During the FMD crisis there 
was much con fusion and distrust, which provided the right 
kind of setting for rumour and gossip to flourish. Rumour and 
gos sip took on new dimensions and played an important role 
in the exchange and transfer of information about events and 
also in people’s behaviour and activities. As farmers were iso­
lated, unable to meet, much of their information came third-
and fourth-hand via informal channels of gossip and rumour. 
This study used a mixed method approach of semi-structured 
interviews with members of farming house-holds. It con­
cludes with suggestions as to what various ac tors, including 
libraries, in similar crisis situations could learn from this study 
by examining how lessons learned concerning the role of gos ­
sip and rumour in the FMD crisis may be applied to other cri­
ses, particularly the current H1N1 virus (swine fl u) pan demic. 
Introduction 
The 2001 foot and mouth (FMD) outbreak con­
stituted the biggest crisis ever to affect the farm­
ing system in the UK; it was one of the worst 
epidemics of its kind in the world with 6 million 
animals being slaughtered. FMD is an infectious 
viral disease affecting cloven-hoofed animals, in 
particular cattle, sheep, pigs and goats. FMD 
spreads rapidly and is serious for animal health 
and for the economics of the livestock industry. 
Farmers and rural communities were disrupted 
and traumatized as FMD spread rapidly through 
the whole of the country in the course of two 
weeks. The epidemic cost over $14 billion, and was 
one in a succession of crises to strike the British 
farming and food industries (Ward, Donaldson & 
Lowe 2002). It occurred within four months of the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE – mad 
cow disease) crisis when people had already lost 
faith in the country’s food supply chain. With 
7,000 civil servants, 2,000 vets, and 2,000 troops 
brought in to dispose of carcasses at the height 
of the outbreak, the UK Ministry of Agriculture 
faced a massive logistical exercise (Hetherington 
2002). 
The FMD crisis unfolded as a series of informa­
tion and communication problems, primarily from 
government to farmers, with consequences for ac­
tion in a time of crisis. As processes and procedures 
for dealing with infected animals, and biosecuri­
ty measures implemented by the government 
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changed, farmers were living in conditions rife 
with uncertainty. As a means of coping with 
these conditions farmers had to decide who and 
what information sources to trust, and from 
whom to seek information. This was of particular 
importance, as acting upon trusted information 
which took on greater significance during the 
crisis could shape and influence the nature of the 
crisis. 
What is unique about this crisis was that the 
FMD outbreak was a crisis of isolation. Already 
geographically remote and isolated farming com­
munities suffered ‘isolation within isolation’. As 
biosecurity measures were implemented to con­
trol the spread of the disease, the places where 
farmers usually met to communicate and exchange 
information, for example, the auction marts and 
the pubs, either shut down or became inaccessi­
ble. As movement restrictions were imposed on 
people, animals and equipment, farmers became 
physically isolated and confined to their farms. 
Many were unable to leave their farms for several 
weeks and even several months. With the current 
swine-flu pandemic and the subsequent isolation 
of individuals, families, and other groups of peo­
ple (Bailey 2009; Johnston 2009) this study, al­
though concerned with an animal disease, has 
particular and continuing signifi cance. 
In addition, the information perspective of the 
crisis became apparent as an important area of 
study as it was not covered in detail in any of the 
three major inquiries (Anderson 2002; Curry 2002; 
Follett 2002) that were carried out after the crisis. 
This paper identifies the information needs of 
farmers during the outbreak and explores the role 
of rumour and gossip as a means of conveying 
information between the various actors. It focuses 
on the Cumbrian region (a county in the north 
west of England and home of the Lake District 
National Park) which was the area most severely 
hit by the FMD. It concludes with suggestions as 
to what various actors in similar crises situations 
could learn from this study. 
Methodology 
The data for this paper is taken from a wider study 
(Hagar 2005) which explored the multiple in­
formational needs that faced the Cumbrian farm­
ing community during the crisis. The study used a 
mixed method approach of semi-structured inter­
views. Semi-structured interviews allowed re­
spondents scope to highlight issues not covered in 
the interview questions such as the role of gossip 
and rumour. The unit of analysis was the farming 
household; hence the sample covers 11 cases. The 
key informant in each household was interviewed, 
as well as other household members where pos­
sible. Key informants are those responsible for 
managing the farming business during the FMD 
crisis. This could be the male farmer, the female 
farmer, both or another member of the family. 
It is difficult to approach farmers without some 
entrée into their world. Farmers, particularly male 
farmers, have a reputation for being solitary and 
wary of strangers. In view of this, “snowball” 
or “chain-referral” sampling was used, a non-
probability sampling technique, which is of par­
ticular use for hard to reach populations. (Flick 
1998; Atkinson & Flint 2001). This technique 
“yields a study sample through referral made 
among people who are or know of others who 
possess some characteristics that are of research 
interest” (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981, 141) and is 
useful in trying to use and building upon pre­
existing relations of trust to remove barriers to 
entrance (Loftland & Loftland 1995). Snowball 
sampling takes advantage of the social networks 
of identified respondents to provide an ever-
expanding set of potential contacts (Thomson 
1997). 
By using snowball sampling the data collected 
may only reflect a particular perspective, and 
thereby omit the voices and opinions of others 
who were not part of the network (Atkinson & 
Flint 2003). In order to address these potential bias 
issues in this study, three initial contacts were 
used from different ‘worlds’ who could give ac­
cess to different strands of interviewees. These 
contacts did not know each other and gave entrée 
into potentially different worlds of farmers. The 
contacts were: 
1. A local activist in the FMD crisis who was also a land­
owner and farm-owner. 
2. A farmer who was active in the Farm Crisis Network 
(http://www.farmcrisisnetwork.org.uk) which pro­
vided emotional and social support to farmers. (The 
Farm Crisis Network was developed in 1993 to help 
families in farming and related activities who are ex­
periencing any kind of problems. It is based on local 
groups whose members have a combination of technical 
and pastoral understanding and are able to respond 












3. The Director of Pentalk (http://www.pentalk.org), a 
community network which was set up by farmers dur­
ing the crisis, who suggested the names of Pentalk co­
ordinators (who have responsibility for the organization 
of the farmers’ ICT activities in particular geographic 
regions) to contact. The Pentalk co-ordinators also 
suggested the names of farmers to contact. 
Identifying new interviewees continued until 
no new findings were emerging. This point was 
judged to be reached after 17 interviews had been 
conducted with farmers and members of the 
farming household, when no new data on the 
topic of information use during the crisis was 
emerging. 
Farmers’ information needs and seeking 
Interviews revealed that farmers’ information 
needs can be divided broadly into two parts: 1) 
information required at the different stages of the 
crisis to inform them about the various processes 
and procedures that had to be carried out once a 
farm had been infected; and 2) information on the 
complex system of biosecurity measures intro­
duced by the government. There were many gaps 
in the information needed; there was not enough 
information; it conflicted with earlier information 
or information from other sources; and it was dis­
seminated and received too late for the required 
purpose. 
During the FMD crisis, it was difficult for farm­
ers to sustain their social networks because they 
no longer had access to communal spaces. In­
formation seeking was difficult as farmers were 
physically isolated, unable to go to the normal 
meeting places where they would exchange in­
formation with other farmers. Information seeking 
was also taking place in an information environ­
ment which was complex, with many diverse ac­
tors, networks and agencies involved in the re­
sponse to the crisis. The nature and scale of the 
epidemic was unprecedented; disease control 
measures were complex; policies and strategies 
were adjusted to dealing with an emerging situa­
tion; legal requirements and implementation on 
the ground were subject to continual change in 
order to address problems as they developed. The 
government’s information gathering, processing 
and dissemination infrastructure demonstrated 
a lack of central control in meeting farmers’ in­
formation needs. 
At every stage of the outbreak, farmers did not 
get information to help them understand the crisis 
and consequently they were unable to make sense 
of the crisis – they had many questions. They 
wanted to know: Why was the crisis happening? 
Did it really have to happen? How did FMD 
spread? Why did one farm get it and another not? 
How had the virus got there in the fi rst place? 
Important themes to emerge as to why it was 
difficult to meet farmers’ information needs are 
those linked to information and trust. The crisis 
was a time of great uncertainty; farmers were rec­
ognizing who and what they trusted. Key ques­
tions were: What information did farmers trust? 
Which providers of information did they trust? 
Who trusted whom? As farmers distrusted much 
of the information that reached them, this lack of 
trust led to people making up stories, rumours 
and gossip. 
Rumour and gossip 
Whenever there is social strain, as for example in a 
crisis, rumours and gossip are virulent (Allport & 
Postman 1947, 1). Rumours are underpinned by 
a desire for meaning to cope with uncertainties 
(Michelson & Mouly 2004). Because farmers were 
not acquiring the information they needed to deal 
with the crisis, they began to seek information in 
the rumours and gossip which circulated during 
the outbreak. They were trying to create a narra­
tive that made sense and filled in the gaps of their 
knowledge 
Often rumour and gossip are treated as the same 
concept as there are many similarities between 
them. Common to both is that information is re­
ceived third hand (Suls 1977). Rumour differs 
from gossip primarily by being speculative and 
sometimes pertaining to events while gossip per­
tains mainly to people (Wert & Salovey 2004). A 
rumour can be defined as “specific (or topical) pro­
position for belief, passed along from person to 
person, usually by word of mouth, without se­
cure standards of evidence being present” (All­
port & Postman 1947). Rumours can be defi ned as 
“unverified or false brief reports … with surpris­
ing content” (Renard 2001). They are generally of 
only temporary interest; they come and go and 
sometimes the same ones recur. By defi nition ru­
mour is a social phenomenon; it takes at least two 
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in a specific community. “They are passed on 
among a social milieu as true and current and ex­
pressing something of that group’s fears and 
hopes” (Renard 2001). 
Whereas the basis of rumour is information that 
is unsubstantiated, gossip need not necessarily con­
cern a known fact (Rosnow & Fine 1976). Much 
of the information that human beings seek and 
receive is gossip (March & Sevon 1988). Content 
distinguishes the gossip genre as pertaining to 
people rather than events, i.e. the information 
received in gossip is about people, what they do, 
how they do it and so on. 
Gossip can be a conduit for all sorts of useful 
information (Baumeister, Zhang & Vohs 2004). It 
is useful for conveyance of information to others, 
facilitates information fl ow and allows for the re­
distribution of information. Because gossip is es­
sentially talking about other people’s activities and 
behaviour, it is a source of social information about 
people (Bloom 2004). Similarly to rumour, gossip 
helps bond the community together (Baumeister, 
Zhang & Vohs 2004) and can be useful for social 
influence. Yerkovich (1977) in her exploration 
of the positive aspects of gossip suggested that 
“because it is a sociable process, the content of talk 
is not as important as the interaction which the 
talking supports”, the part it plays in creating and 
maintaining social relationships. Misinformation 
is often associated with gossip and is also at the 
heart of condemnations of gossip (Harrington & 
Bielby 1995). In normal circumstances, two-thirds 
of conversation time is devoted to social topics, 
most of which can be given the generic label 
gossip (Dunbar 2004). However, in times of crisis 
gossip tends to increase, particularly in close-knit 
communities. 
The next two sections follow Wert and Salovey 
(2004) in making a distinction between rumour 
and gossip: rumour as speculation pertaining to 
events, and gossip as pertaining to people. They 
explore the nature and function of rumour and 
gossip during the crisis and how these infl uenced 
farmers’ information seeking. 
Rumour 
As farmers’ lives were deeply affected by the cri­
sis, the emotional overtones of the crisis bred all 
sorts of fantasies. There were so many rumours 
circulating that farmers did not know whose story 
to believe. Farmer A spoke about the number of 
rumours circulating, “There were that many ru­
mours flying about that folk didn’t know what to 
believe … just giving a confused message.” Ru­
mours spread primarily through telephone con­
versations; and they became an outlet as farmers 
sought explanations as to how FMD had occurred 
and how it was spreading. Rumour was described 
by Farmer B as, “It’s just local people talking to 
local people.” However, interviews suggested 
that rumours such as a suggestion that the crisis 
was a deliberate ploy by ‘Europe’ to cripple 
British farming also came from non-local sources 
(see Table 1. Rumour topics). 
One of the basic conditions for rumour is am­
biguity (Allport & Postman 1947). In the crisis, am­
biguity was induced by the absence of information, 
the conflicting nature of information, and distrust 
of information. The crisis was an extremely 
emotional time for farmers, and ambiguity was 
induced by the emotional tensions that made 
farmers unable or unwilling to accept the facts 
and their consequences, for example in the ‘3 km. 
cull,’ when many healthy animals needed to be 
slaughtered within a 3 km. radius of an infected 
farm. 
Right from the very beginning of the outbreak, 
farmers were trying to identify how FMD had 
started. Rumours circulated citing pigswill at the 
Burnside pig-farm located at Heddon-on-the 
Wall, in the county of Northumbria, as causing 
FMD (Guardian Editorial 2001). During one of 
the interviews, Farmer B gave an account of this 
rumour: 
They [British Airways] would scrape it all into a dust-
bin and take it to him and hand it to him raw. Well a lot 
of that meat was carrying all kinds of things. It was all 
supposed to be boiled up to a certain temperature, to kill 
all of the bugs. There were knives and forks (indicating 
that he wasn’t boiling the swill) and everything in his pig-
troughs. 
Rumours circulated about four main topics: how 
FMD had started; how FMD spread; government 
involvement in the outbreak and vaccination. 
Table 1 lists some examples. 
A major difficulty for farmers in the crisis was to 
decide whether they were listening to information 
or rumour. As Allport and Postman (1947) argue 
in making a distinction between information and 






Table 1: Rumour topics 
Topic Examples 
Causes of FMD The connection between British Airways and pigs – swill at 
Burnside Farm, Heddon-on-the Wall. 
An MIR space station. 
Test tubes full of the FMD virus had been planted by animal 
rights activists 
Government involvement FMD crisis was a deliberate ploy by Europe or the UK 
Government to cripple British farming. 
Orders were placed for huge quantities of railway sleepers and 
coal, weeks before the first disease was confirmed [these were 
used to build the pyres to burn the carcasses, implying that the 
government had some prior warning of the outbreak]. 
The government avoided mobilizing the army at an early stage 
to prevent pre-national election panic.
 The National Farmers’ Union was in cahoots with the 
government to wipe out small farms and their stock, to bring 
subsidy payments under control and more order to over 
supplied markets. 
ness or remoteness of the evidence upon which the 
information or rumour rests. Farmers were often 
forced to judge whether the informant really knew 
about what they talked about. It was diffi cult for 
farmers to judge the degree of the informant’s ex­
pertise and impartiality. They spent a lot of time 
trying to interpret and make sense of the various 
stories and trying to decide whether the in­
formation was trustworthy or not. Not knowing 
what or what not to believe one farmer described 
the crisis as being “a very unproductive time,” i.e. 
they spent a lot of time thinking about who and 
what to trust. 
In the rumours there was often some degree of 
truth, but in the course of transmission it became 
so overlaid with elaboration that it was no longer 
possible to separate or detect what was true or 
not. Farmer C said that he often believed there 
was some degree of truth in a rumour but they 
never quite knew how much: 
Someone told me about this low flying helicopter, fl ying 
around dropping the virus. I can guarantee that there 
would have been a helicopter. I guarantee that helicopter 
would be doing something but suddenly the story why got 
worse and worse. I heard that one. I heard them all. 
As farmers struggled to interpret what in­
formation to trust in rumours, they also tried to 
make sense and extract the trustworthy stories in 
gossip about farmers, vets and the government. 
Gossip 
Much of the information that farmers were seek­
ing and receiving in the FMD crisis was gossip. 
During the crisis, people felt the need for greater 
communication, including talking about other peo­
ple’s activities and behaviours. 
Gossip constitutes a valuable source of “second­
hand” information about others. At a simple level, 
gossip includes “idle talk” or “chit chat” about dai­
ly life, it forms an important component of human 
interaction. Gossip networks, social proximity and 
visibility characterize social life in rural areas 
(Parr & Philo 2003), including the farming com­
munity. The oral ‘tradition’ is the bedrock upon 
which farming communities are formed, and in 
normal circumstances daily gossip of farmers pro­
vides an important dynamic through which judg­
ments and values of community life are trans­
muted and refined. Farmers live in close-knit 
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Table 2: Types of gossip 
Topic Examples 
Farmers about farmers Whose farm had been infected? 
What precautions were farmers taking? 
Who was not disinfecting (a biosecurity measure introduced by 
the government) their farm? 
How much monetary compensation were farmers receiving 
from the government? 
Farmers about vets Knowledge and skills of ‘foreign’ vets (who were drafted to 
the UK as there were not enough UK vets to deal with the 
outbreak). 
Movement of vets between farms (vets visited farms carrying 
out inspections and carrying out various procedures). 
Farmers about DEFRA officials Lack of practical knowledge about farming and lack of 
knowledge about procedures. 
Farmers about workers involved in the crisis The FMD virus was planted by slaughter-men 
Drivers of wagons transporting carcasses were throwing out 
‘substances’ spreading FMD. 
an important role and were described by one 
farmer as ‘gossipy’. As farmers were isolated, it 
was impossible for them to communicate in their 
normal way, for example face-to-face, at auctions, 
at farmers’ discussion meetings, at the pub; they 
gained a lot of information from an intermediary. 
It is difficult to estimate the amount of gossip 
that took place during the crisis, given that gossip 
tends to be private behaviour (Wert & Salovey 
2004). However, evidence from the interviews con­
firmed Farmer D’s remark, “There was a lot of 
gossip [about] who was spreading it [FMD].” In­
formation flowed from one farmer to another via 
‘gossip channels’ and was often transmitted more 
rapidly through gossip than the formal channels. 
For example farmers often knew from other farm­
ers whose farm had been infected before they had 
been informed by the UK government’s Depart­
ment for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA). 
Gossip was used as a way of conveying stories 
and exchanging information to others. Table 2 
categorizes the types of gossip which occurred 
primarily between: farmers about farmers; farmers 
about vets; farmers about DEFRA offi cials, and 
farmers about other workers involved in the crisis, 
such as the slaughter-men. 
Gossip about farmers 
Farmers talked about other farmers in their neigh­
bouring areas. They talked about whose farm had 
been infected, e.g. were they disinfecting their 
farms as instructed by the government? Farmer E 
said, “Then, of course, there is the odd person that 
you always hear about who didn’t do any dis­
infecting or anything who never got FMD.” They 
talked about what precautions farmers were tak­
ing, and how much monetary compensation farm­
ers were getting from the government. Evidence 
from the interviews implied that farmers were 
categorizing other farmers by their membership 
in the community, and by their actions in response 
to government mandates. A reputation network 
was being constructed or confirmed by these be­
haviours. 
Seeking and receiving information brought 
about a common understanding, bonded neigh­
bouring farmers together, and created group 








farmers strengthened, as they discussed the crisis, 
relied on each other for emotional support, and as 
new communities such as the Pentalk community 
network were established. 
Gossip about vets 
Interviews revealed that much of farmers’ gossip 
about vets focused on the information they re­
ceived from them, e.g. their views on how FMD 
spread. As farmer F recalled, “I had a vet and 
others round the dining room table there and 
eventually got the vet to agree that badgers could 
have spread it.” Another main topic for gossip was 
farmers’ interactions and problems encountered 
with vets who were drafted in from other countries 
to help deal with FMD and the communication 
and language problems that arose. 
The movement of “clean” vets (vets who had 
only worked on uninfected farms) and “dirty” 
vets (vets who had worked only on infected farms) 
and the movement of vets between farms whilst 
making surveillance inspections and undertaking 
eradication operations was also a topic of gossip. 
They were concerned that the vets’ movements 
had increased the risk of disease spread. Farmer G 
commented, “Gossip was that the “clean” vets 
were staying in the same hotel as the “dirty” vets 
that had been on infected farms. It seemed stupid.” 
The vets staying at the hotels (where they stayed 
while travelling to different farms) were not local, 
and again these examples signify the importance 
of trust placed in the familiar and the known. 
Gossip about DEFRA offi cials 
Farmers gossiped about DEFRA offi cials, par­
ticularly in the context of the questions they had 
asked and the replies received from them. Farmers 
compared answers they had received from DEFRA 
officials. A big topic of conversation was the 
group of people referred to as ‘outsiders’, people 
who had not previously worked for DEFRA and 
were brought into support the existing DEFRA 
staff. Their lack of knowledge and farming terms 
was highlighted during the interviews. Farmer H 
remarked: “The girl behind the desk [DEFRA 
desk] didn’t know the answers.” 
Gossip became one of the channels through 
which farmers gained economic information. They 
discussed the valuations of stock of other farmers 
and the compensation claims other farmers were 
making to the government for the loss of their 
animals. Gossip can become “an outlet for hostile 
aggression” (Stirling 1956, 263), and as farmers 
became increasingly angry at the government and 
as the crisis seemed to get out of control, it was 
also used to convey malicious information about 
DEFRA workers. 
Gossip about FMD workers 
Information as to how FMD spread was also 
sought through gossip about other people who 
were involved in the crisis, such as the slaughter-
men. Farmer I said, “The virus was planted on 
farms by the slaughter-men, to increase their in­
come.” Men who transported the carcasses were 
also the subject of gossip. As farmer J recalled, 
“Members of a wagon company were throwing 
out substances from a wagon window as they 
were driving along the road spreading FMD and 
so on.” In all of these examples of gossip, the 
importance of trust in people who were known 
and familiar is highlighted and a distrust in those 
people who were unknown. 
Gossip and information 
Gossip has informational value. However, one 
of farmers’ key concerns was: how reliable was 
the informational content? How much of the in­
formation conveyed in the message could be 
trusted? Deciding if gossip is trustworthy often 
depends on the type of relationship among the 
communicators (Turner et al. 2003). Often, in gos­
sip, the person providing the information is not 
easily identified, so it is difficult to make a judg­
ment as to how much was true. As Farmer K re­
marked, “the general conversation was general­
ly doom and gloom and unfounded stories, there 
might have been a smidgen of truth in it some­
where, but I don’t know.” 
Misinformation is often associated with gossip 
and, even though farmers were aware that a lot of 
the gossip was not true, it was difficult for them 
to ignore the information received within the gos­
sip. In normal circumstances it is difficult to ig­
nore gossip, but in a crisis situation where farm­
ers were desperately trying to understand what 
was happening, it was even more difficult as farm­
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researchers argue that in gossip the main theme 
essentially remains intact as information is being 
transmitted (Ayim 1994). There were many gen­
eralizations made in the gossip; however, it was 
precise information that farmers needed, not gen­
eralizations. For example, they needed to know 
with certainty if their neighbouring farmers had 
been confirmed with FMD; and they needed to 
know exact details of the composition of dis­
infectants used to disinfect farms. Gossip does not 
lend itself to providing accurate information, as 
Farmer L remarked: 
Farmers tend to exaggerate things when they talk amongst 
themselves so you have to be very careful who you listen 
to. It’s like when people tell you something and you say 
where did you hear that and they say oh on the back of the 
Mirror [The Daily Mirror, a UK tabloid newspaper] right 
we’ll just leave [not believe] that one. 
Gossip is often associated with women and, in 
some feminist criticism, it is nearly synonymous 
with “women’s talk” (Coates 1988), while in men’s 
conversation it is referred to as “shop talk.” Evi­
dence from interviews suggests that during FMD, 
women gossiped more about emotional matters 
and the men more about the events. 
Summary 
Rumour and gossip played an important role in 
the exchange and transfer of information received 
third-hand, from one person to another about 
events, and also people’s behaviour and activities. 
Rumour and gossip need to have “the right setting 
and … the properly licensed conditions” (Abra­
hams 1970, 292). The FMD crisis, when there was 
much confusion and distrust, provided the right 
kind of setting for rumour and gossip to fl ourish. 
Also as farmers were isolated, unable to meet, 
much of their information came third- and fourth-
hand via informal channels of gossip and rumour. 
Rumour and gossip can be considered trivial, but 
in this crisis situation even greater attention was 
paid to what people were saying, as rumours and 
gossip took on new dimensions; people listened to 
both even more in order to try and make sense of 
the situation. 
In normal communication systems, information 
supply and demand are balanced: the main group 
of information is conveyed by formal channels, 
and just a few rumours and gossip are spread 
by informal channels (Shibutani 1966). In the cri­
sis the formal channels of information from the 
government, and particularly DEFRA, fell into 
discredit and informal channels abounded with 
rumours. Often information via rumour and gos­
sip was transmitted quickly as information from 
the government was not being delivered. 
The key question was what information pro­
viders and sources could farmers trust. In both 
rumour and gossip there is often some residual 
particle of news, a ‘kernel of truth’, but in the 
course of transmission it has become so overlaid 
with fanciful elaboration that it is no longer 
separable or detectable.
 Questions raised by this study are: How much 
information in rumour and gossip was true and 
how was that worked out? Are rumour and gossip 
untrustworthy or can they lead to trust? 
Lessons learned 
Finally, it is useful to consider how lessons in this 
study may be applied to other crises, particularly 
the current H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic which 
provides the “the right setting and … the properly 
licensed conditions” (Abrahams 1970, 292) for 
rumour and gossip. At the beginning of the FMD 
crisis, rumour and gossip circulated very quickly; 
the same rapid spread is seen now with the onset 
of the swine flu pandemic, as gossip and rumours 
abound. 
Both crises have the spread of a virus in com­
mon, and an examination of the H1N1 rumour and 
gossip topics circulating on Internet sites and blogs 
reveal many similarities in the topics circulating 
during the two crises (see Tables 1 and 2 for FMD 
topics). Gossip and rumours concerning the H1N1 
virus include: who is infected?; where does the 
H1N1 virus originate?; how quickly does the virus 
spread?; how is the virus passed on?; how many 
people will get it?; what precautions to take?; what 
about vaccination – who will be given priority 
for vaccination?; and, government involvement – 
is swine flu just a big rumour to jumpstart the 
economy by making people spend money on the 
health industry and boost the global economy? 
Although FMD spreads between animals and the 
H1N1 virus between people, in both crises, people 
are asking the same kind of questions and there 











As people were not getting answers to their 
questions during the FMD crisis, the formal chan­
nels for communicating information from the gov­
ernment fell into discredit and informal channels 
abounded with rumours. As information from 
the UK government was not being delivered, in­
formation via rumour and gossip was transmitted 
quickly. Governments need to learn from this 
experience, and need to attempt to alleviate ru­
mour and gossip in crisis situation by pro­
viding people with timely access to trusted 
information sources. Recently in the UK callers 
to the National Pandemic Flu Service (http:// 
www.Direct.gov.uk/pandemicflu) have been con­
cerned about the abilities of the staff working on 
the hotline to give accurate diagnostic information. 
Staff read out a prepared set of questions and 
assess suspected cases of swine-flu. Mistrust in 
this system has led to newspaper headlines, for 
example in the Daily Mail: “Swine flu hotline run 
by 16-year olds: NHS pays GCSE pupils to give 
advice and handout drugs” (Gysin 2009). Such 
headlines in national newspapers sew the seeds 
of gossip and rumour. Similarly, during FMD 
crisis, farmers questioned the knowledge of staff 
working on the DEFRA information helplines, 
many of whom had no agricultural background 
(Hagar 2005).
 Since the FMD crisis, technologies have become 
more available and accessible. During the FMD 
crisis many farmers used the Internet and email 
for the first time to access information and to talk 
with other farmers. This ‘new’ technology enabled 
a more rapid spread of rumour and gossip 
throughout the isolated farming community. By 
using newer Web 2.0 technologies rumour and 
gossip concerning the swine-flu virus and pan­
demic can circulate at great speed and to a wider 
audience. Often information concerning a crisis 
is available on social networking spaces such as 
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Bebo within minutes 
of a crisis occurring. These tools increasingly 
have the capacity and power to inform and also 
to misinform. Governments need to be aware of 
the power of these tools, their ability to circulate 
gossip and rumours, and their potential to create 
panic. A strong government presence is needed on 
these tools to inform the public and to attempt to 
alleviate gossip and rumour, as much as one can 
during a crisis. As part of a government strategy, 
libraries and information centres can play an 
important role by directing the many stakeholders 
in crises e.g. lay people, experts, and policy-
makers to trustworthy sources of information. 
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